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Abstract 
We examine the association between institutional ownership, political connections, and analyst 
following in Malaysia from 1999 to 2009. Based on 940 firm-year observations, we document 
a positive relation between institutional ownership, particularly by Employees Provident Fund 
(EPF), and analyst following, thus supporting the governance role that institutional investors 
play in promoting corporate transparency. However, there is no evidence that political 
connections matter to analyst following. The monitoring role of institutional investors, 
including EPF, does not appear to be any different between politically connected and non-
connected firms.  
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1.0 Introduction  
Financial analysts play an important intermediary role in the capital market by providing 
information about firms, including estimates of earnings and price forecasts and buy/sell 
recommendations (Healy & Palepu, 2001). Analysts’ services are also demanded by external 
parties to assist in monitoring (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Brown et al., 2011) and valuing the 
firms (Bradshaw, 2011). Bushman and Smith (2001) and Healy and Palepu (2001) find lower 
information asymmetry for firms with greater analyst following, suggesting that analysts 
provide an important contribution to the firm’s information environment (Bushman et al., 
2004).  
Studies that examine the determinants of analyst following have centred on firm 
characteristics, including institutional ownership (O’Brien & Bhushan, 1990; Hussain, 2000; 
Ackert & Athanaskos, 2000, 2003; Fernando et al., 2012) and corporate governance (Baik et 
al., 2010; Yu, 2010) as well as the rules and regulations of the capital market (Tan et al., 2011). 
However, nothing is known about how analyst following is related to political connections. 
Our first aim in this paper is to fill this void by providing the first evidence on the association 
between political connections and analyst following in Malaysia. 
The intimate ties between the business elites and political leaders are an integral part of 
many economies, particularly the emerging economies, including Malaysia. In Malaysia, 
almost one-third of the listed firms are known to be politically connected (Faccio et al., 2006). 
The extant evidence shows that politically connected firms are highly opaque, and that there is 
greater information asymmetry between the connected firms and market participants, such as 
financial analysts. The opacity is due in part to the higher complexity and uncertainty of the 
income generation process created by the connection (Chen et al., 2011). The protection that 
government provides to connected firms, e.g., government bailouts (Faccio et al., 2006) and 
the imposition of tariffs on competitors (Goldman et al., 2013), allows managers of these firms 
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to practise greater discretion on financial disclosure thus further contributing to firm opacity 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2003). Indeed, Chaney et al. (2011) find that the quality of accounting 
information is significantly poorer for politically-connected firms, and Lim et al. (2014) report 
that these firms have a less timely price discovery process. Riahi-Belkaoui (2004) finds 
managers in connected firms camouflage their performance, increasing earnings opacity. All 
these studies suggest that connected firms have a poorer information environment. As analysts 
are attracted to firms with more informative disclosure policies (Lang & Lundholm, 1996), we 
thus predict that there is a negative relation between political connections and the number of 
analysts following the firms. Since connected firms receive preferential treatment from 
governments1 and are thus less reliant on external funding (Faccio et al., 2006), analysts also 
have less incentive to forecast the earnings of these firms. 
Our second aim is to examine the association between institutional ownership and analyst 
following. Institutional investors have substantial market power, influence, and sophistication 
in gathering and interpreting information about the firm (Grier & Zychowicz, 1994; Abdul 
Wahab et al., 2007). These attributes provide institutional investors considerable advantage in 
monitoring corporate activities compared to other investors. Karpoff (2001) finds that 
institutional investors are successful in shareholder activism, prompting firms to act in 
accordance with investors’ needs. Aggarwal et al. (2011) find a positive relation between 
institutional ownership and corporate governance in a cross-country study. Some supporting 
evidence of this in Malaysia is provided by Abdul Wahab et al. (2008). 
The effectiveness of institutional investors as a monitoring body has been recognized by 
governments that incorporate institutional monitoring duties into regulations in order to ensure 
                                               
1 These preferential treatment include easy access to cheaper bank loans (Chaney, Faccio & Parsley, 2011; 
Claessens, Feijen & Laeven, 2008; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Khwaja & Mian, 
2005); the awarding of profitable government contracts (Goldman, Rocholl & So, 2013; Bertrand, Kramarz, 
Schoar & Thesmar, 2007; Wu, Wu & Rui, 2012); and lower taxation (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar & Thesmar, 
2007; Faccio, 2010). 
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adequate oversight (Starks, 2000). In Malaysia, the Finance Committee in Corporate 
Governance (FCCG) highlighted the need for greater involvement by institutional investors in 
corporate governance after the 1998 Asian financial crisis. This has resulted in the 
establishment of the Minority Shareholders Watchdog Group (MSWG), which aims to protect 
the interest of minority shareholders through shareholder activism and acts as an independent 
research organization to advise and encourage good governance practices amongst publicly 
listed firms (MSWG, 2010). There are four founding members of MSWG,2 which collectively 
dominate the market share of institutional investments in Malaysia (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007). 
Ammer and Abdul Rahman (2009) investigate the effectiveness of shareholder activism by 
MSWG, and find that MSWG-targeted firms earn higher stock returns than non-targeted firms 
in the long run. They note that the two most important issues raised by MSWG during annual 
meetings are financial reporting and corporate governance. Domestic institutional investors can 
thus provide effective monitoring of corporate behaviour (Chhaochharia et al., 2011).  
We argue that financial institutions are able to mitigate information asymmetry by 
pressuring firms to disclose information. Since institutional investors play an important 
governance role by promoting corporate transparency, we thus predict that firms with higher 
institutional ownership have greater analyst following, all else equal. Further, in performing 
their fiduciary duties (Hawley and Williams, 1997), institutional investors are likely to demand 
for analyst services to help them assess the potential investee firms (O’ Brien & Bhushan, 1990; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hussain, 2000; Jennings, 2005). This suggests it is more profitable 
for analysts to follow firms with higher institutional shareholdings. Thus, analyst following is 
expected to be higher for these firms.  
                                               
2 The four founding members of MSWG are the Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Lembaga Tabung Angkatan 
Tentera (LTAT), Social Security Organisation (SOCSO), and Pilgrim Fund Board (LUTH). 
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The effectiveness of institutional investors as monitors of politically connected firms is 
less clear. One the one hand, the presence of institutional investors in connected firms is 
expected to promote better reporting environment and increase corporate transparency, thus 
attracting greater analyst following. However, in Malaysia, government proxies sit on the 
advisory board of MSWG members. Political involvement in firms’ decision making suggests 
that MSWG investment is likely to be dictated by the government. In an attempt to enhance 
Bumiputera shareholdings in the capital market under the New Economic Policy (NEP),3 these 
domestic institutional investors are likely to skew their investment toward connected firms 
rather than firms with better governance. The presence of institutional investors in connected 
firms may thus be politically driven rather than for governance purposes. This argument 
predicts that the relation between analyst following and institutional ownership is attenuated in 
politically connected firms.  
Based on a sample of 940 firm-year observations from 1999 to 2009, we find some 
evidence of a positive relation between institutional ownership and analyst following. This 
supports the corporate governance argument that institutional investors demand greater 
information disclosure, thus attracting more analysts to the firm. We extend the analysis to 
reflect the heterogeneity in institutional investors in Malaysia, and find that the ownership of 
Employees Provident Fund (EPF), the largest institutional investor in Malaysia, is an important 
determinant of analyst following. Specifically, firms with a higher EPF shareholding have 
significantly greater analyst following. This result is consistent with the significant 
participatory role played by EPF in corporate governance (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007). 
However, MSWG shareholdings are not significant in explaining analyst following. 
                                               
3 The New Economic Policy (NEP) was a social re-engineering and affirmative action program formulated by the 
National Operation Council in the aftermath of the 1969 racial riot in Malaysia. NEP was adopted in 1971 for a 
period of 20 years and ucceeded by the National Development Policy (NDP) in 1991. The main objective of NEP 
(and its successor, NDP) is to achieve national unity by eradicating poverty, irrespective of race, and by 
restructuring the society to achieve inter-ethnic economic parity between Bumiputera and non-Bumiputera 
(Gomez and Jomo, 1999). Its second objective is to reduce inter-ethnic economic differences. 
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Despite the strong and well-documented presence of political connections in Malaysia 
(Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Faccio et al., 2006), we find no evidence that political connection 
is an important determinant of analyst following. The monitoring role of institutional investors, 
including EPF, does not appear to be any different between politically connected and non-
connected firms.  
Our paper contributes in the following ways. First, it contributes to the increasing volume 
of research that has capitalized on the political economy of Malaysia (Gomez & Jomo, 1999; 
Johnson & Mitton, 2003; Adhikari et al., 2006; Gul, 2006; Fraser et al., 2006; Abdul Wahab 
et al., 2007; Bliss & Gul, 2012a, 2012b) by showing whether a firm is politically connected 
matters to analysts’ decision to follow the firm. Second, we add to the literature on the 
heterogeneity in institutional shareholders by showing the type of institutional monitoring in 
Malaysia that matters to analyst following. Our findings have important implications for other 
countries in the neighbouring region where strong government intervention is a salient feature 
of the capital markets, and which can substantially affect the information environment for 
investors. 
The rest of paper is set as follows. Section 2 provides a background discussion of political 
connections and institutional investors in Malaysia. Section 3 outlines our research design, and 




2.1 Political Connections 
Selznick (1949) argues that political connections exist due to uncertainty of government 
regulations, and lead to firms working together with the government. Theories forwarded by 
North (1990) and Olson (1993) suggest that the connection provides government with a means 
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of controlling the firms so that they will act in congruence with the government’s agenda. 
Politicians have been known to extract rents generated by these connections (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1994),4 and in return, the connected firms would receive preferential treatment such 
as precedence over government contracts.  
 The growth in research interest on political connections in Malaysia has largely spun 
from the work of Gomez and Jomo (1999). Subsequent studies utilise their data on political 
connections and provide valuable insights into the various roles of political connections in 
Malaysia, e.g., Johnson and Mitton (2003) on capital control, Adhikari et al. (2006) on effective 
tax rates, Gul (2006) on audit fees, Fraser et al. (2006) on leverage, Abdul Wahab et al. (2007) 
on corporate governance, and Bliss and Gul (2012a, 2012b) on leverage and cost of debt 
respectively. Cross countries studies such as Bushman et al. (2004) and Faccio et al. (2006) 
have also examined political connections in Malaysia in relation to transparency and other 
characteristics of connected firms. We add to this line of research by investigating political 
connections in relation to analyst following. 
 
2.2 Institutional Investors  
The purpose of the three government bodies in Malaysia, namely departmental agencies, 
statutory bodies, and government owned firms, is to accelerate Bumiputera participation in 
employment, education, and the corporate sector, in particular (Gomez & Jomo, 1999). The 
latter is achieved through a restructuring of equity participation where foreign equity is to be 
reduced from 60 to 30 percent, Bumiputera equity raised from practically zero to 30 percent, 
and Chinese and Indian equity maintained at 40 percent (Norhashim & Abdul Aziz, 2005). 
Based on data gathered from various Malaysian Plans, we report that Bumiputera share 




ownership has increased from a mere 1.5 percent in 1969 to 21.9 percent in 2008 (Appendix 
A).  
Subsequent to the establishment of NEP, it is an “open secret” that the domestic 
institutional investors in Malaysia provide government the vehicle to enhance and protect the 
economic interests of Bumiputera investors. Domestic institutional investors are run by 
Bumiputera who typically hold the position of the Chair of the board of directors. 
Appointments to the Investment Advisory Board for the top five domestic institutional 
investors in Malaysia, namely EPF, PNB, LTH, LTAT, and SOCSO, are politically motivated 
(Norhashim & Abdul Aziz, 2005) as the Board reports directly to the Ministry of Finance 
(Asher, 2001). It is worth noting that investments of these institutional investors are heavily 
biased towards Bumiputera-run corporations (Norhashim & Abdul Aziz, 2005). A point in case 
is the gradual takeover of Malaysian Airline System (MAS) from Naluri Berhad by two main 
government-run institutional investors, Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen (KWAP) and Bank 
Simpanan Nasional (BSN), in 2001. Although this may be construed as a pure political bailout, 
others may see this takeover as an important national obligation as there were speculations of 
a foreign takeover of MAS.  
Foreign institutions, mostly pension funds, make up a negligible fraction (~1%) of 
institutional investors in the Malaysian capital market. Among them are California Public 
Employees’ Retirement System (CALPERS), Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association - 
College Retirement Equities Fund (TIAA-CREF), United Nation Pension Funds, and State of 
Ohio Retirement Scheme.   
Since the Asian financial crisis, the role of institutional investors in Malaysia has changed 
dramatically in that they are now expected to play a much bigger role in the capital market, not 
only to facilitate the government objectives, but also to enhance good governance in firms. 
Recent evidence suggests that the relation between institutional ownership, particularly by 
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EPF, and corporate governance has strengthened subsequent to the corporate governance 
reform in 2001 (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007), in line with the lead role taken by the EPF in 
establishing MSWG.  
 
3.0 Research Design  
To test the research aims, we run the following regression model: 
 
Ln(Analyst_Following)it=a0Constantit+a1Institutional_Ownershipit+ 
 a2Political_Connectionit+a3(Political_Connection × Institutional_Ownership)it+  
a4Forecast_Errorit+a5X_Listedit+a61/Priceit+a7Sizeit+a8Dualityit+ 
a9Board_Independenceit +a10Management_Ownershipit+Industryit+Periodit+errorit,   
 
where the dependent variable (Ln(Analyst_Following) is the natural log transformation of the 
number of analysts following a firm. Our independent variables of interest are 
Institutional_Ownership, Political_Connection, and their interaction.  
Institutional_Ownership is measured by the percentage ownership of the top five 
institutional investors in a firm, consistent with Hartzell and Starks (2002) and Abdul Wahab 
et al. (2008). Since institutional investors are known to have different goals and adopt different 
ways to achieve these goals (Brickley et al., 1988, Bushee et al., 2009),5 we construct three 
additional institutional ownership variables to capture institutional investor heterogeneity in 
Malaysia. Mintchik et al. (2011) and Chan et al. (2013) provide evidence that the heterogeneity 
in institutional investors matters to the properties of analyst forecasts; transient investors are 
drawn to firms with lower forecast errors.  
                                               
5 Bushee et al. (2009) employs trading behaviour to assign institutional investors into three distinct groups. The 
first is transient investors which are institutions with high portfolio turnover and high diversification.  The second 
group is dedicated investors which are institutions that are characterised by low portfolio turnover and 




We first compute MSWG, which constitutes the cumulative shareholdings of the four 
founding domestic members of MSWG. For the second alternative institutional ownership 
variable, we single out the shareholding of EPF as it is the largest pension fund in the country. 
The sheer size of EPF suggests that it has the resources to influence the governance structure 
of its investee firms, which should lead to better financial disclosure. Abdul Wahab et al., 
(2007) report the relation between EPF shareholding and corporate governance has 
strengthened subsequent to the corporate governance reform in 2001. The third variable is 
OTHERS, which consists of the cumulative institutional shareholdings that do not fall into 
MSWG and EPF.  
Political_Connection takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically connected and zero 
otherwise. A firm is defined to be politically connected if at least one of its large shareholders 
or top officers is a member of parliament, a minister, or is closely related to a top politician or 
a party (Faccio et al., 2006). We extend the list of politically connected firms developed by 
Johnson and Mitton (2003) to include firms controlled by Khazanah Berhad6 and those 
identified by Gul et al. (2010). Appendix B provides the list of politically connected firms in 
our sample.  
We control for a number of variables in the tests. Following Lang and Lundholm (1996), 
Lang et al. (2004), and Yu (2010), we control for earnings surprise since analyst following is 
expected to be lower for firms with greater earnings surprise. Earnings surprise 
(Forecast_Error) is proxied by the absolute difference between the analyst forecast of earnings 
per share (EPS) and actual EPS scaled by share price. Cross-listed firms are subject to greater 
disclosure requirements and are thus expected to be associated with greater analyst following 
                                               
6 Khazanah Nasional Berhad is the investment holding arm of the Government of Malaysia entrusted to hold and 
manage the commercial assets of the government and to undertake strategic investments. Khazanah was 
incorporated under the Companies Act 1965 on 3 September 1993 as a public limited company. The share capital 
of Khazanah is owned by the Minister of Finance, a body corporate incorporated pursuant to the Minister of 
Finance (Incorporation) Act, 1957. 
10 
 
(Chen & Steiner, 2000). We control for cross-listed firms by assigning a value of one to 
X_Listed if the firm is also listed in a foreign exchange and zero otherwise. The inverse of share 
price (1/Price) is included in the regression as Brennan and Hughes (1991) find it to be 
negatively related to analyst coverage. Financial analysts tend to follow larger firms which 
have the potential to generate more business for them (Ackert & Athanassakos, 2003; 
Bradshaw, 2011). Larger firms also have a richer information environment which further 
attracts analyst following. We control for firm size using the natural log transformation of 
market capitalization as at the end of the financial year (Size).  
Corporate governance quality is also controlled for in the test. Arguments for a positive 
relation between corporate governance and analyst following reside on the premise that good 
governance promotes corporate disclosure (Fan & Wong, 2002). This in turn lowers the 
analyst’s cost of providing an earnings forecast and thus incentivize the analyst to follow the 
firm (Yu, 2010). Conversely, Healy and Palepu (2001) and Jiraporn et al. (2008) regard analyst 
coverage as a substitute for corporate governance. Good governance in this case lessens the 
usefulness of the analyst report so that better governed firms with a richer information 
environment attract fewer analysts. We utilise three corporate governance variables that reflect 
the board structure. The first is Duality, which takes a value of one if the CEO and Chairman 
positions are held by the same person and zero otherwise. The second is board independence 
(Board_Independence), measured by the proportion of independent directors on the board. The 
third governance mechanism that we control for is managerial ownership 
(Management_Ownership). Potential expropriation by managers is higher in firms with lower 
managerial ownership as the interests between managers and shareholders are less aligned in 
these firms. 
Finally, we control for industry sectors. Moyer et al. (1989) argue that some industries 
are affected by regulatory bodies or legal regulations and constraints, and that the regulatory 
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bodies which oversee these sectors may reduce investors’ demand for external financial 
analysis by acting as a substitute to monitoring. We include year dummies to control for 
unobserved time effects, including changes in macroeconomic conditions occurring during the 
sample period.  
 
4.0 Data 
Our sample comprises non-financial firms listed on Bursa Malaysia for the period 1999 
to 2009. Data on institutional ownership, managerial ownership, Bumiputera directors, and 
various governance variables are collected from annual reports sourced from the Bursa 
Malaysia’s website, and Compustat Global and Mergent Online databases. We then merge this 
sample with the sample of firms with data on analyst following from I/B/E/S database. This 
procedure results in a final sample of 940 firm-year observations. 
Panel A of Table 1 shows that the average number of analysts following a firm is 6.21, 
close to the figure reported by Yu (2010). The average (median) institutional ownership is 
16.88 (11.71) percent, and ranges from zero to 94.37 percent. The average (median) 
shareholding of the largest domestic institutional investor, EPF, is 5.31 (3.32) percent, and that 
of the MSWG members stands at 6.66 (2.27) percent. Institutional investors in the OTHERS 
group include state-owned funds, insurance firms, trusts, and foreign institutional investors, 
and collectively, their average (median) shareholding is 4.89 (0.73) percent. About 28 percent 
of our sample firms are politically connected.   
Panel B shows that the market capitalization (Size) of sample firms averages RM 2.433 
billion and has a median of RM 614 million. The average (median) absolute forecast error is 
67.8 (16.8) percent of share price, and ranges from zero to 2000 percent. Only 6.3 percent of 
sample firms are cross-listed. Looking at the governance variables, the average (median) 
proportion of independent directors on the board is 36.58 (33.33), consistent with the 
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governance code which recommends that at least one third of the board should consist of 
independent directors. About 35.20 percent of the firms have Duality where the CEO and 
Chairman functions are held by the same person. The average and median managerial 
ownership are 5.51 and 0.20 percent respectively, with a maximum of 95.73 percent.  
{Table 1 here} 
5.0 Results  
Table 2 provides both Pearson and Spearman-rank correlations between variables. As 
expected, the correlation between Institutional_Ownership and Ln(Analyst_Following) is 
0.192 (p<0.01) and 0.234 (p<0.01) for Pearson and Spearman-rank respectively. Therefore, 
there is some preliminary support for the prediction that analyst following is greater for firms 
with higher institutional ownership. Firm size is positively and significantly correlated with 
institutional ownership and analyst following, suggesting that larger firms have greater analyst 
following and higher institutional shareholding. There is also a positive and significant 
correlation between the political connection variable and institutional ownership and analyst 
following.  
{Table 2 here} 
In Table 3, we segregate the firms into those with “high” and “low” analyst following 
using the sample median (N=3) as the cut-off. Results show that firms with high analyst 
following have significantly higher institutional ownership and are larger in size. This finding 
is consistent with the monitoring role of institutional investors in enhancing corporate 
disclosure, and the greater transparency of larger firms. The univariate tests show that firms 
with high analyst following are also more likely to be politically connected (POLCON) and 
cross-listed (X_Listed), and have lower managerial ownership.  
{Table 3 here} 
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We regress analyst following on its determinants in Table 4, which reports the results for 
various specification models. In specification (1), we include only the control variables. Both 
the institutional ownership and political connection variables are added in specification (2), 
and their interaction is added in specification (3).  
Results show a positive and significant relation between institutional ownership and 
analyst following (0.004, t=1.713) in specification (2). A one standard deviation increase in 
institutional ownership increases the number of analyst following by one. Hence, consistent 
with our prediction and Bhushan (1989) and O’Brien and Bhushan (1990), firms with higher 
institutional ownership attract greater analyst following. This finding thus supports the 
argument that institutional investors play an important governance role by ensuring more 
informative corporate disclosure policies.  
{Table 4 here} 
Contrary to expectations, we find a negative but insignificant coefficient for 
Political_Connection, suggesting that analyst following for politically connected firms is 
indistinguishable from that of other firms. One possible explanation for this is that the 
connected firms have the biggest slice of domestic institutional investments, which are mostly 
controlled by the government. In other words, the relation between political connection and 
analyst following is attenuated by institutional ownership. We test this in specification (3). 
However, the results show that the interaction term Political_Connection × 
Institutional_Ownership is also insignificant. Of the set of control variables, we find that 
analyst following is positively related to firm size and the inverse of share price (I/Price), but 
negatively related to earnings surprises.  
In Table 5, we consider the heterogeneity of institutional investors in Malaysia. 
Specifications (1), (3), and (5) report the results for EPF, MSWG, and OTHERS respectively. 
In specifications (2), (4), and (6), we include the interaction term between each of these 
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heterogeneous groups of institutional investors and the political connection dummy. Results 
show that there is a significantly positive coefficient only for EPF. Therefore, unlike the other 
groups of institutional investors, firms that have higher shareholdings by EPF have greater 
analyst following. Our results thus hint on the effectiveness of EPF in enhancing corporate 
governance (Abdul Wahab et al., 2007) and more specifically corporate transparency, which 
helps to attract more analysts to the firms. The interaction variable EPF × Political_Connection 
(specification (2)) is insignificant, suggesting that EPF plays a similar role in politically 
connected firms.  
There is some evidence that politically connected firms have less analyst following, as 
shown in specification (2), consistent with the notion that connected firms are more opaque. 
None of the interaction terms are significant. The results for the control variables are as before, 
with firm size, the inverse of price, and earnings surprise remaining significant in explaining 
analyst following. 
{Table 5 here} 
 
5.1 Robustness: Endogeneity 
The relation between analyst following and institutional ownership may be subject to 
simultaneity bias since firms with higher analyst following are also likely to attract more 
institutional investors. O’Brien and Bhushan (1990) argue that analysts’ decision to follow a 
firm and financial institutions’ decision to invest in the firm are jointly determined through 
demand and supply considerations of brokerage (which employ analysts) and institutional 
investors. That is, analysts are motivated to follow firms with larger institutional holdings 
because of the fee that they can get for providing services to the institutions. At the same time, 
institutions are attracted by the marketing of brokerages’ services and therefore are likely to 
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invest more heavily in firms that are followed extensively by analysts (O’Brien and Bhushan, 
1990; Hussain, 2000).  
Our study employs an instrumental variable (IV) in a two-stage least squares (2SLS) 
regression to address this potential simultaneity bias. We use Bumiputera directors, return on 
assets (ROA), leverage, and systematic risk as the instruments for the suspect endogenous 
variable, the percentage of institutional ownership.  
The establishment of NEP and its successor NDP is to promote Bumiputera 
shareholdings in the capital market. Among the initiatives of the NEP is the establishment of 
Bumiputera-friendly institutions such as PNB, EPF, LTAT, and LTH, which are expected to 
skew their investment towards firms with Bumiputera directors. Having more Bumiputera 
directors on the board is thus an important determinant of institutional shareholdings. The 
presence of Bumiputera directors is a unique institutional feature of the Malaysian market and 
is not likely to directly influence the number analysts following the firm, except potentially 
through institutional ownership. Firm performance provides another instrument since 
institutional investors are likely to be attracted to firms with good performance, but is not 
directly related to analyst following. We use the return on assets (ROA) calculated over the 
period of five years to proxy for firm performance. Similarly, leverage and systematic risk are 
likely to affect institutional ownership (as a substitute monitoring mechanism) but not analyst 
following. Leverage is total debt to total assets, and systematic risk (Beta) is computed using 
the market model on the last 250 days of stock returns. 
We control for corporate governance. Bushee and Noe (2000) explain why corporate 
disclosure, as a dimension of corporate governance, is an important determinant of institutional 
ownership. First, institutional investors may be attracted to better governed firms with greater 
information disclosure if such disclosure reduces the price impact of trades. Second, 
institutional investors may be sensitive to corporate disclosure practices if such disclosures 
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influence the potential for profitable trading opportunities. Third, corporate disclosure practices 
may be important to institutions if they rely on public disclosure for corporate governance 
activities. Chung and Zhang (2011) argue that institutional investors prefer firms with better 
governance for fiduciary responsibilities, lower monitoring costs, and liquidity reasons. They 
find institutional shareholding increases with governance quality. We also control for 
Managerial_Ownership  and Size since managerial ownership can act as a governance 
mechanism in mitigating agency conflicts (Morck et al., 1988; Short & Keasey, 1999), thus 
attracting more institutional investment in the firms, and institutional investors have been 
known to hold a larger stake in larger firms (Gillan & Starks, 2003).   
Results from the 2SLS equations are presented in Table 6. From the first-stage 
regressions, it is evident that the percentage of Bumiputera directors is a predictor of 
institutional investor ownership. However, the (partial) F statistic7 is 7.193 for 
Institutional_Ownership, suggesting that the instruments are somewhat weak. We examine the 
validity of the instrument by computing the overidentification statistic,8 which is chi-square 
(X2) distributed with degrees of freedom equal to the difference between the number of 
instruments and the number of endogenous variables. The statistic shows the instruments used 
for Institutional_Ownership are identified. Finally, the Hausman test does not reject the null of 
no endogeneity. This highlights the importance of addressing the endogeneity of institutional 
ownership, and indicates a preference for 2SLS estimates over that of OLS.  
The results from the second-stage regressions are consistent with the OLS results, and 
show an insignificant relation between Institutional_Ownership and ln(Analyst_Following). 
                                               
7 We employ the F statistics benchmark figure suggested by Stock et al. (2002) which are: 1= 8.96, 2 =11.59, 3 
=12.83, 5 = 15.09, and 10 = 20.88.  
8 The Sargan statistics can be obtained by a regression of the second-stage residuals on all exogenous variables. 
If the instruments are valid, the coefficients on the instruments should be close to zero. The formal test is based 
on the R2 from this model being close to zero. In particular, (n-m)*R2 is distributed χ2 with K-L degrees of freedom, 
where K is the number of exogenous variables unique to the first-stage and L is the number of endogenous 
explanatory variables. “n” is the number of observations while m is the number of variables in the OLS regression. 
Note that this test requires that at least one of the instruments is valid (i.e., exogenous). 
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This result remains insignificant when the interaction term Political_Connection × 
Institutional_Ownership is included in the test, as shown in specification (4).  
{Table 6 here} 
 
6.0 Conclusion 
We investigate whether institutional ownership and political connection are important 
drivers of analyst following in Malaysia, where political involvement in corporate decisions is 
a salient feature of the capital market. Our sample consists of 940 firm-year observations during 
the period 1999-2009. Despite the well documented preferential treatment and protection that 
governments provide to politically connected firms in Malaysia, we do not find any difference 
in analyst following between connected and non-connected firms.  
Consistent with our prediction, we find some evidence of positive relation between 
institutional ownership and analyst following. Therefore, institutional investors seem to 
provide an important corporate governance mechanism by enhancing corporate disclosure 
policies, and this attracts more financial analysts to follow the firms. In examining the 
heterogeneity of institutional investors in Malaysia, we find that the relation between 
institutional ownership and analyst following is driven by EPF. However, the monitoring role 
of institutional investors, including EPF, does not appear to be any different between politically 
connected and non-connected firms. Our results are robust to tests of potential endogeniety 
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Second Malaysia Plan, 1971-1975 (Malaysia, 1971, p. 40) 
Third Malaysian Plan, 1976-1980 (Malaysia, 1976, p. 184) 
Fourth Malaysian Plan, 1981-1985 (Malaysia, 1981, p. 61) 
Sixth Malaysian Plan, 1990-1995 (Malaysia, 1990, p. 13) 
Seventh Malaysian Plan, 1996-2000 (p.86) 
Ninth Malaysian Plan, 2006-2010 (Malaysia, 2006, p. 356-57) 




1969 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2004 2008
Total Bumiputras 1.5 2.4 9.2 12.4 18.5 19.3 20.6 18.9 18.9 21.9
Individual 1 1.6 3.6 4.3 n/a 14.2 18.6 14.2 15 n/a
Institutions 0.5 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 3 2.2 n/a
Trust Agencies n/a 0.8 5.6 8.1 n/a 5.1 2 1.7 1.7 n/a
Total Non-Bumiputras 34.3 34.3 37.5 40.1 49.5 46.8 43.4 41.3 40.6 36.7
Chinese 22.8 27.2 n/a n/a 48.2 45.5 40.9 38.9 39 n/a
Indian 0.9 1.1 n/a n/a 0.9 1 1.5 1.5 1.2 n/a
Others 10.6 6 n/a n/a 0.4 0.3 1 0.9 0.4 n/a
Nominees 2.1 n/a n/a n/a 8 8.5 8.3 8.5 8 n/a
Foreign 62.1 63.3 53.3 47.5 24 25.4 27.7 31.3 32.5 41.4
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
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Appendix B: List of Politically Connected Firms 
 
    
1 AFFIN HOLDINGS BHD 35 PADIBERAS NASIONAL BHD   [S] 
2 AHMAD ZAKI RESOURCES BHD   [S] 36 PETRONAS GAS BHD   [S] 
3 BANDAR RAYA DEVELOPMENTS BHD   [S] 37 PHARMANIAGA BHD   [S] 
4 BERJAYA CORPORATION BHD 38 PROTON HOLDINGS BHD 
5 BERJAYA LAND BHD 39 RANHILL BHD   [S] 
6 BERJAYA SPORTS TOTO BHD 40 SIME DARBY BHD   [S] 
7 BIMB HOLDINGS BHD   [S] 41 STAR PUBLICATIONS (M) BHD   [S] 
8 BOUSTEAD HOLDINGS BHD 42 TANJONG PUBLIC LIMITED COMPANY 
9 CAHYA MATA SARAWAK BHD   [S] 43 TELEKOM MALAYSIA BHD   [S] 
10 CYCLE & CARRIAGE BINTANG BHD   [S] 44 TENAGA NASIONAL BHD   [S] 
11 DIGI.COM BHD   [S] 45 TRANSMILE GROUP BHD  [S] 
12 DRB-HICOM BHD 46 UMW HOLDINGS BHD   [S] 
13 EDARAN OTOMOBIL NASIONAL BHD   [S] 47 UNITED PLANTATIONS BHD   [S] 
14 FABER GROUP BHD 48 YTL CORPORATION BHD  [S] 
15 GOH BAN HUAT BHD   [S] 49 YTL POWER INTERNATIONAL BHD   [S] 
16 GOLDEN PLUS HOLDINGS BHD 50 ARAB-MALAYSIAN CORP 
17 GUOCOLAND (MALAYSIA) BHD 51 CAMERLIN GROUP 
18 HO HUP CONSTRUCTION COMPANY BHD   [S] 52 CEMENT INDS.OF MALAYSIA 
19 HONG LEONG BANK BHD 53 COMMERCE ASSET-HLDG. 
20 HONG LEONG FINANCIAL GROUP BHD 54 GOLDEN HOPE PLTN. 
21 HONG LEONG INDUSTRIES BHD   [S] 55 KEDAH CEMENT HOLDINGS BHD 
22 HUME INDUSTRIES (M) BHD   [S] 56 KUMPULAN GUTHRIE 
23 IJM CORPORATION BHD   [S] 57 LEISURE MANAGEMENT BHD 
24 JAYA TIASA HOLDINGS BHD   [S] 58 MAGNUM 
25 LAND & GENERAL BHD 59 MALAKOFF 
26 LANDMARKS BHD 60 MALAYSIA INTL.SHIPPING 
27 LION CORPORATION BHD   [S] 61 METACORP 
28 MALAYAN BANKING BHD 62 METROPLEX 
29 MALAYSIA AIRPORT HOLDINGS BHD 63 NALURI 
30 MALAYSIAN AIRLINE SYSTEM BHD 64 NANYANG PRESS HDG. 
31 MTD CAPITAL BHD   [S] 65 OYL INDUSTRIES 
32 MULPHA INTERNATIONAL BHD 66 PHILLEO ALLIED BHD 
33 MULTI-PURPOSE HOLDINGS BHD 67 THE NEW STRAITS TIMES PRESS (M) BHD 
34 NCB HOLDINGS BHD   [S]   
    
















Table 1: Descriptive Statistics (1999-2009) 
 
Analyst_Following is the number of analyst following a firm. Institutional_Ownership is top five institutional investors’ 
percentage shareholdings. EPF is percentage shareholdings by EPF. MSWG is the sum of the percentage shareholdings by 
LTH, PNB, LTAT, and SOCSO. OTHERS is the percentage shareholding of other institutional shareholders. 
Political_Connection takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically-connected and zero otherwise. Size is market 
capitalization. Forecast_Error is the absolute forecast error scaled by share price. X_Listed takes the value of 1 if the firm 
is cross-listed and zero otherwise. 1/Price is the inverse of share price. Board_Independence is the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. Duality takes the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman functions are held by the same 
person and zero otherwise. Management_Ownership is the percentage of direct managerial shareholding.  
  
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev. N
ln(Analyst_Following) 1.176 1.099 3.434 0.000 1.145 940
Analyst_Following 6.217 3.000 31.000 1.000 7.185 940
Institutional_Ownership 16.884 11.710 94.371 0.000 18.203 940
EPF 5.317 3.322 84.554 0.000 6.647 940
MSWG 6.669 2.276 75.956 0.000 12.051 940
OTHERS 4.898 0.738 74.464 0.000 11.931 940
Political_Connection 0.282 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.450 940
Size 20.363 20.236 24.993 15.075 1.480 940
Size (RM'000) 2433000 614100 71510000 3524 6251000 940
Forecast_Error 0.678 0.168 20.023 0.000 1.781 940
X_Listed 0.063 0.000 1.000 0.000 0.243 940
1/Price 0.629 0.418 6.897 0.025 0.696 940
Board_Independence 36.580 33.333 85.714 0.000 17.464 940
Duality 0.352 1.000 1.000 0.000 0.478 940
Management_Ownership 5.505 0.203 95.726 0.000 12.712 940
Panel A: Experimental Variables
Panel B: Control Variables
Table 2: Correlation Matrix (1999-2009, n=940) 
 
 
Pearson correlations are in italics. Analyst_Following is the number of analyst following a firm. Institutional_Ownership is top five institutional investors’ percentage 
shareholdings. EPF is percentage shareholdings by EPF. MSWG is the sum of the percentage shareholdings by LTH, PNB, LTAT, and SOCSO. OTHERS is the percentage 
shareholding of other institutional shareholders. Political_Connection takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically-connected and zero otherwise. Size is market capitalization. 
Forecast_Error is the absolute forecast error scaled by share price. X_Listed takes the value of 1 if the firm is cross listed and zero otherwise. 1/Price is the inverse of share 
price. Board_Independence is the proportion of independent directors on the board. Duality takes the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman positions are held by the same person 











Error X_Listed 1/Price 




ln(Analyst_Following) 0.234 *** 0.223 *** 0.583 *** -0.311 *** 0.132 *** -0.21 *** -0.013 0.064 * -0.134 ***
Institutional_Ownership 0.192 *** 0.145 *** 0.229 *** -0.043 0.087 *** -0.069 ** -0.012 0.029 -0.172 ***
Political_Connection 0.234 *** 0.234 *** 0.395 *** -0.001 0.072 ** -0.132 *** -0.089 *** 0.102 *** -0.266 ***
Size 0.579 *** 0.256 *** 0.393 *** -0.272 *** 0.201 *** -0.376 *** -0.049 0.059 * -0.287 ***
Forecast_Error -0.172 *** -0.038 -0.021 -0.158 *** 0.031 0.114 *** 0.08 ** 0.041 0
X_Listed 0.139 *** 0.128 *** 0.072 ** 0.252 *** 0.027 -0.22 *** -0.009 -0.056 * -0.043
1/Price -0.200 *** -0.088 *** -0.119 *** -0.344 *** 0.025 -0.108 *** 0.064 ** -0.099 *** 0.072 **
Board_Independence -0.017 0.005 -0.091 *** -0.040 0.078 ** 0.010 0.064 ** -0.085 *** -0.001
Duality -0.062 * -0.098 *** -0.102 -0.060 -0.049 0.056 * 0.12 *** 0.072 ** 0.203 ***
Management_Ownership -0.148 *** -0.116 *** -0.184 *** -0.237 *** 0.078 ** -0.001 0.041 0.051 -0.134 ***
Table 3: Tests of Differences between Firms with High and Low Analyst Following 
 
 
Firms are considered to have “high” (“low”) analyst following if Analyst_Following>median (Analyst_Following<median). Institutional_Ownership is top five 
institutional investors’ percentage shareholdings. EPF is percentage shareholdings by EPF. MSWG is the sum of the percentage shareholdings by LTH, PNB, LTAT, 
and SOCSO. OTHERS is the percentage shareholding of other institutional shareholders. Political_Connection takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically connected 
and zero otherwise. Size is market capitalization. Forecast_Error is the absolute forecast error scaled by share price. X_Listed takes the value of 1 if the firm is 
cross-listed and zero otherwise. 1/Price is the inverse of share price. Board_Independence is the proportion of independent directors on the board. Duality takes the 




 Mean  Median  Mean  Median p-value p-value
Institutional_Ownership 13.899 8.763 20.660 15.113 0.000 0.000
EPF 3.880 1.952 7.136 6.045 0.000 0.000
MSWG 6.507 2.064 6.874 2.607 0.517 0.218
OTHERS 3.513 0.267 6.650 1.622 0.000 0.000
Political_Connection 0.210 0.000 0.373 0.000 0.000
Size 19.717 19.619 21.181 21.115 0.000 0.000
Size (RM'000) 114800.000 331400.000 4058000.000 1479000.000 0.000 0.000
Forecast_Error 0.934 0.250 0.354 0.101 0.000 0.000
X_Listed 0.042 0.000 0.089 0.000 0.007
1/Price 0.744 0.477 0.483 0.345 0.000 0.000
Board_Independence 36.885 33.333 36.193 36.364 0.612 0.985
Duality 0.377 1.000 0.320 1.000 0.079
Management_Ownership 6.988 0.291 3.629 0.147 0.000 0.003
Low Analyst Following (n=525) High Analyst Following (n=415)
Panel A: Experimental Variables
Panel B: Control Variables
 
Table 4: Regressions Results for Analyst Following (1999-2009, n=940) 
 
 
The dependent variable is the log of the number of analysts following a firm. Institutional_Ownership is top 
five institutional investors’ percentage shareholdings. EPF is percentage shareholdings by EPF. MSWG is the 
sum of the percentage shareholdings by LTH, PNB, LTAT, and SOCSO. OTHERS is the percentage 
shareholding of other institutional shareholders. Political_Connection takes the value of 1 if the firm is 
politically-connected and zero otherwise. Size is market capitalization. Forecast_Error is the absolute forecast 
error scaled by share price. X_Listed takes the value of 1 if the firm is cross listed and zero otherwise. 1/Price 
is the inverse of share price. Board_Independence is the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Duality takes the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman positions are held by the same person and zero otherwise. 
Management_Ownership is the percentage of direct managerial shareholding. *, ** and *** indicate 
significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. 
Expected
Direction (1) (2) (3)
Constant ? -8.853 *** -8.978 *** -8.968 ***
(-11.405) (-11.205) (-11.122)
Institutional_Ownership + 0.004 * 0.004
(1.713) (1.166)
Political_Connection - -0.091 -0.097
(-0.890) (-0.759)
Institutional_Ownership × Political_Connection ? 0.000
(0.082)
Size + 0.463 *** 0.464 *** 0.464 ***
(14.913) (14.124) (14.094)
Forecast_Error - -0.063 *** -0.062 *** -0.062 ***
(-3.681) (-3.605) (-3.605)
X_Listed + 0.021 -0.008 -0.009
(-0.113) (-0.043) (-0.047)
1/Price + 0.089 * 0.091 * 0.091 *
(1.661) (1.704) (1.696)
Board_Independence + 0.002 0.002 0.002
(1.049) (0.904) (0.907)
Duality - -0.022 -0.014 -0.014
(-0.279) (-0.180) (-0.179)
Management_Ownership - -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(-0.231) (-0.228) (-0.230)
Industry fixed ? Yes Yes Yes
Period fixed ? Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R 2 0.388 0.391 0.390
F-statistic 22.268 *** 21.072 *** 20.371 ***
Period F-statistics 4.72 *** 4.496 *** 4.491 ***
29 
 
Table 5: Regressions Results for Analyst Following with Heterogeneous Institutional Investors 
(1999-2009, n=940) 
 
The dependent variable is the log of the number of analysts following a firm. Institutional_Ownership is top five institutional 
investors’ percentage shareholdings. EPF is percentage shareholdings by EPF. MSWG is the sum of the percentage 
shareholdings by LTH, PNB, LTAT, and SOCSO. OTHERS is the percentage shareholding of other institutional 
shareholders. Political_Connection takes the value of 1 if the firm is politically-connected and zero otherwise. Size is market 
capitalization. Forecast_Error is the absolute forecast error scaled by share price. X_Listed takes the value of 1 if the firm 
is cross-listed and zero otherwise. 1/Price is the inverse of share price. Board_Independence is the proportion of 
independent directors on the board. Duality takes the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman positions are held by the same 
person and zero otherwise. Management_Ownership is the percentage of direct managerial shareholding.  *, ** and *** 
indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
  
Expected
Direction (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant ? -8.575 *** -8.549 *** -8.995 *** -8.988 *** -8.992 *** -8.902
(-10.818) (-10.765) (-11.152) (-11.090) (-11.172) (-11.008)
EPF + 0.026 *** 0.021 ***
(4.646) (3.429)
MSWG + 0.000 -0.001
(-0.104) (-0.133)
OTHERS + 0.001 -0.002
(0.328) (-0.367)
Political_Connection - -0.091 -0.206 * -0.070 -0.074 -0.075 -0.099
(-0.925) (-1.653) (-0.692) (-0.672) (-0.733) (-0.912)
EPF × Political_Connection ? 0.019
(1.437)
MSWG × Political_Connection ? 0.001
(0.082)
OTHERS × Political_Connection ? 0.005
(0.693)
Size + 0.449 *** 0.448 *** 0.470 *** 0.470 *** 0.469 *** 0.467 ***
(13.827) (13.808) (14.347) (14.314) (14.188) (14.122)
Forecast_Error - -0.063 *** -0.062 *** -0.063 *** -0.063 *** -0.062 *** -0.063 ***
(-3.763) (-3.688) (-3.653) (-3.653) (-3.638) (-3.666)
X_Listed + 0.030 0.006 0.020 0.019 0.014 0.018
(0.168) (0.036) (0.109) (0.107) (0.078) (0.097)
1/Price + 0.091 * 0.088 * 0.092 * 0.092 0.092 * 0.090 *
(1.719) (1.656) (1.713) (1.706) (1.709) (1.682)
Board_Independence + 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.865) (0.831) (0.996) (0.999) (0.985) (0.996)
Duality - -0.005 -0.005 -0.026 -0.026 -0.024 -0.025
(-0.068) (-0.068) (-0.327) (-0.325) (-0.304) (-0.311)
Management_Ownership - 0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.012) (0.100) (-0.312) (-0.311) (-0.306) (-0.310)
Industry Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R 2 0.407 0.409 0.387 0.387 0.387 0.387
F-statistic 22.506 *** 21.932 *** 20.790 *** 20.098 *** 20.800 *** 20.152 ***




Table 6: Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Equations (1999-2009, n=940) 
 
Institutional_Ownership is top five institutional investors’ percentage shareholdings. Political_Connection takes the 
value of 1 if the firm is politically-connected and zero otherwise. Size is market capitalization. Forecast_Error is the 
absolute forecast error scaled by share price. X_Listed takes the value of 1 if the firm is cross listed and zero otherwise. 
1/Price is the inverse of share price. Board_Independence is the proportion of independent directors on the board. 
Duality takes the value of 1 if the CEO and Chairman positions are held by the same person and zero otherwise. 
Management_Ownership is the percentage of direct managerial shareholding. Bumiputera is the proportion of 
Bumiputera directors. ROA is the return on assets.  Leverage is total debt to total assets. Beta is systematic risk, 
computed using the market model on the last 250 days of stock returns. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 
5 and 1 percent levels respectively. 
 
First-stage




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Constant -50.915 *** ? -8.978 *** -8.625 *** -8.968 *** -8.960 ***
(-2.626) (-11.205) (-8.187) (-11.122) (-10.196)
Institutional_Ownership + 0.004 * 0.013 0.004 0.016
(1.713) (0.918) (1.166) (0.851)
Political_Connection 2.971 - -0.091 -0.113 -0.097 0.099
(1.179) (-0.890) (-0.872) (-0.759) (0.315)
Political_Connection × Institutional_Ownership ? 0.000 -0.010
(0.082) (-0.622)
Size 2.795 *** + 0.464 *** 0.454 *** 0.464 *** 0.468 ***
(3.653) (14.124) (8.665) (14.094) (11.701)
Forecast_Error -0.021 - -0.062 *** -0.060 *** -0.062 *** -0.060 ***
(-0.061) (-3.605) (-3.247) (-3.605) (-3.280)
X_Listed 9.604 * + -0.008 -0.356 -0.009 -0.295
(1.925) (-0.043) (-1.369) (-0.047) (-1.258)
1/Price + 0.091 * 0.046 0.091 * 0.059
(1.704) (0.791) (1.696) (0.962)
Board_Independence -0.002 + 0.002 0.001 0.002 0.000
(-0.035) (0.904) (0.294) (0.907) (0.091)
Duality 2.162 - -0.014 0.040 -0.014 0.048
(1.159) (-0.180) (0.442) (-0.179) (0.538)
Management_Ownership -0.065 - -0.001 0.001 -0.001 0.001









Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Period Fixed Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Hausman Test (t-stats) -0.726 -0.746
Hansan-Sargan (X 2 ) 5.026 5.566
No of Observations 940 940 940 940 940
Adjusted R 2 0.222 0.391 0.422 0.390 0.445
F-statistic 7.193 * 21.072 *** 19.754 *** 20.371 *** 19.182 ***
Period F-statistics 0.585 4.496 *** N/A 4.491 *** N/A
Industry Fixed 
Second-stage (Analyst Following )
